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ABSTRACT
ON THE CHOICE OF A PUBLIC GOOD FOR AGENTS WITH DOUBLE-PEAKED
PREFERENCES
OG˘UZ KU¨C¸U¨KBAS¸
Economics, M.A. Thesis, July 2017
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. O¨zgu¨r Kıbrıs
Keywords: Social choice theory, Voting mechanisms, Strategy-proofness, Double-peaked
preferences
We study the problem of choosing the location of a public good on a finite interval when
agents have double-peaked preferences. A preference relation is double-peaked when an
agent has two most preferred spots and her location is his least preferred in between these
two spots. We assume that the locations of the agents are observable and agents report only
their most preferred spots. We characterize strategy-proof mechanisms, and show that there
is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism for this problem. We also show that our
results still hold when we replace the assumption of a finite interval with the continuity of the
mechanism. Additionally, we discuss the consequences of dropping the assumption that the
locations are observable, and the possibility of strategy-proof mechanisms that use the whole
preference relations of the agents.
iv
O¨ZET
C¸I˙FT TEPELI˙ TERCI˙HLERI˙ OLAN AJANLARLA BI˙R KAMUSAL MAL I˙C¸I˙N YER
SEC¸I˙MI˙ U¨ZERI˙NE
OG˘UZ KU¨C¸U¨KBAS¸
Ekonomi,Yu¨ksek Lisans Tezi, Temmuz 2017
Tez Danıs¸manı: Prof. Dr. O¨zgu¨r Kıbrıs
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal sec¸im kuramı, Oylama mekanizmaları, Manipu¨le edilemezlik,
C¸ift tepeli tercihler
Bireylerin c¸ift tepeli tercihleri oldug˘u durumda, sonlu bir aralıkta tek bir kamusal mal ic¸in
yer sec¸imi problemini c¸alıs¸ıyoruz. Bir birey eg˘er iki adet en c¸ok tercih ettig˘i noktaya sahipse
ve bulundug˘u konum bu iki nokta aralıg˘ında en az tercih ettig˘i noktaysa, tercihi c¸ift tepeli
tercihtir. Bireylerin konumlarının go¨zlemlenebilir oldug˘unu ve sadece en c¸ok tercih ettikleri
noktaları bildirdiklerini varsayıyoruz. Bu problem ic¸in manipu¨le edilemeyen mekanizmaları
karakterize ediyoruz ve aynı anda Pareto optimal ve manipu¨le edilemeyen bir mekaniz-
manın olamayacag˘ını go¨steriyoruz. Aynı zamanda sonlu bir aralık varsayımımızı mekaniz-
manın su¨reklilig˘i ile deg˘is¸tirdig˘imizde sonuc¸larımızın hala gec¸erli oldug˘unu go¨steriyoruz.
Ek olarak, go¨zlemlenebilir konum varsayımımızı kaldırmanın yaratacag˘ı sonuc¸ları ve birey-
lerin tercih bilgisinin tamamını kullanan manipu¨le edilemeyen mekanizmaların olasılıg˘ını
tartıs¸ıyoruz.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Suppose there is only one main street in the town where Mr. A lives, and the municipality is
planning to build a school on that street. A nearby school means increased traffic and noise
during some hours, which Mr. A would like to avoid. Moreover, suppose that he also has a
child at school age, and does not want the school to be too far away either. In this case, Mr.
A would prefer the school to be constructed at some distance to his house, in other words, his
most preferred spots (which we will call his peaks) for the new school would be two points
to the right and to the left of his location (Filos-Ratsikas et al., 2017). These peaks are not
necessarily symmetric to the location of Mr. A, as it is possible that one side of the road is
going up the hill, and therefore Mr. A wants the distance to be smaller if the school is built
on that side.
The above is an example of what we call in this thesis double-peaked preferences.
Double-peaked preferences are so that, an agent has two most preferred points on a real
line and his location is his least preferred spot in between these two peaks. Double-peaked
preferences can also represent political preferences of individuals on certain matters when the
policy space is modeled on a real line (Egan, 2014), or individual preferences on government
spending for a public good such as education when private alternatives also exist (Flowers,
1975). In the literature review, we discuss those examples in a more detailed manner.
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We consider a problem where we need to decide the location of a public good. There
is a group of agents, and they all have double-peaked preferences for the possible spots as
discussed in the previous paragraph. There are many ways to choose such a location: for
instance, we can make one of the agents a dictator, and choose one of his peaks regardless of
the preferences of other agents; or we can randomly select a peak, among the ones that the
agents report. We call such a process a mechanism. More formally, a mechanism collects
information about the problem and provides a solution. Our main purpose for this study is to
find ”good mechanisms”, that is to say, mechanisms that have desirable properties. We talk
about these properties later in the introduction.
There are not many studies involving double-peaked preferences in the mechanism
design literature. However, related domains such as single-peaked and single-dipped prefer-
ences have been studied extensively. Consider the case of a school teacher in our previous
example. She might prefer the school to be built just next to her house for convenience. In
this case, since she is worse off as the distance between the school and her location increases,
her location would be her most preferred spot. Such a preference where an agent has a unique
most preferred choice among the set of alternatives is called a single-peaked preference. Un-
der certain institutional constraints as to the location of the public facility, our domain is
related to problems with single peaked preferences. For instance, suppose the municipality
decides to build the school to the left of Mr. A’s location for a reason independent of agents’
preferences. Now, Mr. A would actually have only one feasible spot that he prefers the most,
and between the end of the street and his location, his preference would be single peaked. An-
other domain that is related to ours is single-dipped preferences. An example of that would
be the construction of a waste treatment facility. Agents would prefer the facility to be as far
away from their houses as possible in this case. This would mean the least preferred point
(dip) for an agent would be her location, and the most preferred point would be either one of
the ends of the street, depending on the distance of the agent to those ends. This domain also
shares a similarity to ours in the same way as the single-peaked domain. If the municipality
decides that the school will be built close enough to the location of Mr. A, such that the set
of alternatives contain the location of Mr. A but not his peaks, Mr. A’s preference would be
single-dipped in this reduced space.
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The two related literatures on social choice and mechanism design focus on designing
mechanisms with desirable properties. A very central property in the literature is strategy-
proofness. It has been the main focus of many studies since Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite
(1975). A mechanism is strategy-proof if no agent can obtain a more desirable outcome by
misrepresenting her preferences, no matter what the other agents do. It is important since we
do not want an agent to be worse off when she reports her true preferences.
Another desirable property in the literature is Pareto efficiency. A ”social choice” is
Pareto efficient if by changing the social choice it is not possible to make one agent strictly
better off without hurting another. If a mechanism is not Pareto efficient, we might end up
with outcomes over which the agents can unanimously improve upon. In the social choice
literature, Pareto efficiency is usually treated alongside with strategy-proofness (e.g. see
Moulin (1980)).
Lastly, one might like to have a notion of fairness in such collective decisions. The most
common fairness concept in the social choice literature is anonymity. Anonymity requires
that every agent is treated equally, in the sense that the mechanism bases its choices on the
agents’ preferences, not their identities. The famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies
that any nontrivial strategy-proof mechanism must be dictatorial when there are three or more
alternatives (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975). Therefore, special attention was given to
restricted domains in the social choice literature to find mechanisms that are both anonymous
and strategy-proof.
Our purpose is to find non-trivial mechanisms that satisfy two of these desirable prop-
erties mentioned above, namely strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency. However, this is a
demanding task as it is evidenced by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975). Yet, there are
also possible results in the literature for restricted domains. For example, in the case of single-
peaked preferences, anonymous, strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms are known
to exist (Moulin, 1980). In the case of single-dipped preferences, unanimous, strategy-proof
and Pareto efficient mechanisms are known to exist (Manjunath, 2014). In the case of double-
peaked preferences with unknown locations, the existence of position invariant, anonymous
and strategy-proof mechanisms is also documented (Filos-Ratsikas et al., 2017).
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Our strategy is as follows. First we make strong assumptions regarding what is ob-
servable and what the mechanism uses as information. We assume that the locations of the
agents are observable, hence limiting the room for potential misrepresentation by agents.
This is a strong assumption, and when agents have the liberty to report their locations, the
class of strategy-proof mechanisms becomes substantially smaller even with further restric-
tions (Filos-Ratsikas et al., 2017). Moreover, similar to what Moulin (1980) did in the case
of single-peaked preferences, we restrict our attention to mechanisms that use only the peak
information of individual preferences. Following Moulin (1980) we call such mechanisms as
voting mechanisms. Hence, agents report only their peaks, with the only condition that these
peaks are at the opposite sides of their locations. Lastly, we assume that the range of the
mechanism is a finite interval, since all of the examples about double-peaked preferences we
discussed above involves a finite interval of alternatives. Equipped with these assumptions,
we first analyze the existence of strategy proof mechanisms. Our main result, Theorem 1,
shows that a mechanism is strategy-proof if and only if it is a Generalized Median Mecha-
nism (GMM). We then analyze mechanisms that satisfy Pareto efficiency on top of srategy
proofness. We show that there is no strategy-proof mechanism that is also Pareto efficient.
Lastly, we analyze the implications of weakening these assumptions. We show that if instead
of voting mechanisms, we consider all possible mechanisms there are strategy-proof mech-
anisms other than GMMs. Alternatively, we know from Filos-Ratsikas et al. (2017) that if
the agents’ locations are unknown, then only strategy-proof mechanisms are GMMs which
guarantee that either the leftmost or rightmost peak is selected.
In the next chapter, we provide a literature review. In Chapter 3, we present our model.
In Chapter 4, we demonstrate our results that we discussed above. In Chapter 5, we conclude.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Modern social choice theory starts with Kenneth Arrow’s Social Choice and Individual Val-
ues which includes Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. Arrow (1963) shows that any preference
aggregating procedure that has three properties, namely Universal Domain (any type of pref-
erence is admissible), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (if the order of two alternatives
does not change between two different preference profiles, the resulting societal ordering
should not change for these two alternatives), and Pareto efficiency (also known as unanim-
ity, meaning that if everyone prefers one alternative over another, it should be the same in the
societal ordering), implies dictatorship.
Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) famously show that under the assumption of
universal domain, all non-dictatorial mechanisms are manipulable with the exception of some
trivial cases. Barbera` and Peleg (1990) shows that this impossibility result still holds when
the set of alternatives is not finite and agents have continuous preferences. This brings us
to the quest of finding restricted domains that are relevant to real life situations, and where
non-dictatorial and strategy-proof mechanisms are possible.
We focus on the problem of choosing a location for a single public good. This problem
has been the center of a growing literature, following Moulin (1980) which provided a char-
acterization of anonymous, strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms when agents have single-
peaked preferences. Moulin (1980) focuses on mechanisms that use only the peak informa-
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tion. However, this does not create a loss of generality as Barbera` and Jackson (1994) shows
that strategy-proofness implies that the mechanism uses only the peak information when pref-
erences are single-peaked. Moulin (1980) shows that for n-many agents with single-peaked
preferences, any anonymous and strategy-proof mechanism can be represented by a median
mechanism with n+1 ghost voters, and Pareto efficiency is achieved in addition to these two
properties if the number of ghost voters is n-1.
Barbera` et al. (1993) shows that under single-peaked domain any strategy-proof mech-
anism is a Generalized Median Voter Scheme, such that every element of the set of alter-
natives has a (winning) coalition that can guarantee that element’s selection by the mecha-
nism. Barbera` et al. (1993)’s analysis is similar to ours in a sense that it focuses on strategy-
proofness only, and its characterization contains mechanisms that are not anonymous as a
result. Masso´ and Moreno de Barreda (2011) provides a characterization similar to Moulin
(1980) but when the preferences of the agents are symmetric around their peaks, and shows
that discontinuous mechanisms are now allowed in the class of strategy-proof rules. It is
argued that, this is a significant contribution since in most real life situations the set of alter-
natives is possibly not a continuous interval (Masso and Moreno de Barreda, 2011).
A stronger notion regarding manipulability is group strategy-proofness, which means
no group of agents can collude by misrepresenting their preferences to achieve a more de-
sirable result for themselves. In the single-peaked domain strategy-proofness and group
strategy-proofness are equivalent, and Barbera` et al. (2010) shows that a property defined
for preference relations called indirect sequential inclusion is necessary and sufficient for
such equivalence.
There has also been studies that focus on relations between different restricted domains,
such as Barbera` and Moreno (2011) which shows that single-peaked, single-plateaued, sin-
gle crossing and order restricted domains all share a common root called top monotonicity.
Barbera` and Moreno (2011) demonstrates that this property is sufficient to guarantee a voting
equilibria at the peak of the median voter. While this study is not directly related to ours, we
would like to mention that double-peaked preferences does not satisfy top-monotonicity.
Another domain that is similar to ours is single-dipped preferences, for which Manjunath
(2014) provides a characterization of strategy-proof mechanisms. All unanimous and strategy-
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proof mechanisms belong to a class called voting by extended collection of 0-decisive sets
(VEZD), which always chooses either one of the ends of the set of alternatives and is also
Pareto efficient (Manjunath, 2014). A VEZD is defined on an extended collection of 0-
decisive sets (in other words, winning coalitions), and a tie breaker function for the case
when every agent is indifferent between both ends (Manjunath, 2014). An example of a
VEZD is the majority rule where the end that more agents prefer over the other is chosen
(Manjunath, 2014). We note that, the case of doubled-peaked preferences strongly resembles
that of the single-peaked preferences, rather than single-dipped preferences. This is due to
the fact that we fix agents’ locations (local dips), hence, each agent actually reports a single
peak for two separate set of alternatives relative to her location.
Filos-Ratsikas et al. (2017) is the closest study to ours as it also assumes agents have
double-peaked preferences. However, in Filos-Ratsikas et al. (2017) agents report their lo-
cations, and it is assumed that the distance of peaks to their location is same and symmetric
for everyone. In other words, once the agent’s location is known, his symmetric preferences
around it can be directly constructed from the location information. When agents report their
locations, and their peaks are of known distance to their location, only strategy-proof mech-
anisms are those that select either the leftmost peak or the rightmost peak (Filos-Ratsikas et
al., 2017). In the motivating example given at the beginning of the thesis, the agent’s loca-
tion is observable by the mechanism designer. What is not observable is his most preferred
locations to the left and right of his location. The fact that we assume agents’ locations are
known to the mechanism but not their peaks, makes our model distinct from Filos-Ratsikas
et al. (2017), and we obtain a larger class of strategy-proof mechanisms as a result.
There are several studies in the literature that mention the observation of double-peaked
preferences among individuals. Flowers (1975) mentions that the preferences of the individ-
uals on the level of public spending on education is very likely to exhibit double-peakedness.
It is argued that the availability of private schools as a substitute for public schooling creates
a possibility for individuals to exhibit a double-peaked preference (Flowers, 1975). This is
due to the fact that a parent would want her child to attend either a public or a private school.
For the former, she would prefer a high level of government spending on public education,
whereas for the latter she would prefer the government spends a very low amount or nothing
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at all, so that she will not be paying higher taxes for a service she does not intend to use.
Clearly, a parent would not prefer a level of spending that is in the middle, such that the
quality of public schools is not high enough whereas taxes are also not that low.
There is also experimental evidence that the policy preferences of individuals can be
double-peaked, especially in matters that they think the status quo fails to achieve a goal
that is desired for both ends of the political spectrum (Egan, 2014). For instance, a lower
crime rate or a higher economic growth rate is desirable for any political faction in the soci-
ety. In such problems where the status quo is not perceived to be an effective policy towards
these goals by the public, the local dip that we call the location of an agent becomes the
status quo. For instance, in Egan (2014), almost half of the sample exhibits a double-peaked
policy preference on the issue of foreign economic competition. It is also suggested that
double-peakedness increases in the population as the public deems a policy matter more ur-
gent (Egan, 2014). However, Egan (2014)’s definition of a double-peaked preference, where
agents are not necessarily indifferent between their two peaks, is slightly different than ours.
Nevertheless, the experimental evidence and the plausibility of the real life scenarios involv-
ing double-peaked preferences make it promising to examine the strategy-proof and Pareto
efficient mechanisms in this domain.
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CHAPTER 3
THE MODEL
Let N = {1,2, ...,n} be a finite set of agents and let X = R be the commodity space. Let
δ = (δ1, ...,δn) ∈ XN be a profile of locations. Throughout the paper, δ will be fixed. For
agent i with location δi, let Ri be a preference relation on X and let Pi and Ii be the strict
preference and indifference relations associated with Ri, respectively. For two alternatives
x,y ∈ X , we have xPiy if and only if xRiy and y 6Rix, and it means agent i is strictly better off
when x is chosen over y. We have xIiy if and only if xRiy and yRix, which means agent i is
neither better off or worse off when one of the alternatives is chosen over the other. We first
give a formal definition of double-peaked preferences.
Definition 1 Ri is a double-peaked preference relation on X if there exists pi1(Ri),pi2(Ri),δi ∈
X such that pi1(Ri)< δi < pi2(Ri), pi1(Ri)Iipi2(Ri), pi1(Ri)Piδi, pi2(Ri)Piδi, and for all x,y ∈ X:
x < y≤ pi1(Ri) implies yPix
pi2(Ri)≤ y < x implies yPix
pi1(Ri)≤ y < x≤ δi implies yPix
δi ≤ x < y≤ pi1(Ri) implies yPix.
A preference profile is an n-tuple of preference orderings. Let R be the class of all
double-peaked preferences on X . Note that, while the peaks are functions of Ri, we do not
use the similar notation for δi to emphasize the fact that it is fixed for each agent.
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Since X = R, each agent has preferences over the whole real line. However, we are
interested in choosing a spot from a finite interval, as it is more applicable to the real life
situations that we discussed in the introduction. Therefore, we define the feasible set F ⊆ X
separately.
We define a mechanism as follows.
Definition 2 A mechanism is a function M :RN → F, such that it assigns a single point x
∈ F for each preference profile.
Next, we provide definitions for strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency. If a mecha-
nism is strategy-proof, then reporting true preferences is a weakly dominant strategy for each
agent.
Definition 3 A mechanism M : RN → F is strategy-proof if for all i ∈ N and Ri,R′i ∈ RN ,
M(Ri,R−i)RiM(R′i,R−i).
If a mechanism is Pareto efficient, then for any outcome of the mechanism, there exists
no other alternative that is weakly preferred by all agents and strictly preferred by one of
them.
Definition 4 A mechanism M :RN → F is Pareto efficient if for all RN ∈RN and for every
x ∈ X such that x 6= M(R1, ...,Rn): xPiM(R1, ...,Rn) for some i ∈ N implies there exists j ∈ N
such that M(R1, ...,Rn)Pjx.
We focus on mechanisms which only take the peaks and the locations of agents into
account. We call such mechanisms as voting mechanisms. In our setting, locations of agents
are known to the mechanism, and therefore agents only report their peaks, and these reported
peaks must be consistent with their location.
Definition 5 M is a voting mechanism if it only responds to the pi1(Ri),pi2(Ri),δi information
in a preference relation Ri. Formally, for each Ri,R′i such that pi1(Ri) = pi1(R′i),pi2(Ri) =
pi2(R′i), and δi = δ ′i , we have M(Ri,R−i) = M(R′i,R−i).
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Define Π(R) = {pi1(R1),pi2(R1), ...,pi1(Rn),pi2(Rn)} as the set of all peaks, and let
Π(R) ⊆ Π(R) be any subset. We define a class of mechanisms called Generalized Median
Mechanisms (GMM) that is similar to the one defined in Proposition 3 of Moulin (1980). A
GMM has a parameter for every subset of Π(R). By each subset, it first takes the supremum
among the elements of the subset and its parameter. After that, it takes the infimum among
these supremums.
In the case of single-peaked preferences, an agent can only be represented in a coalition
by its single peak. Since, in our case each agent has two peaks, we define our grand set as
the set of peaks. Any subset of this grand set can be the set which a GMM works with. For
instance, Π(R) can contain only one peak of agent i but two peaks of agent j. In this case,
agent j is represented in some subsets of Π(R) by its left peak and it is represented by its
right peak in the others. Since we take the supremum of each subset and its parameter, it does
not matter whether a subset contains only the right peak of an agent or both of the peaks, as
the right peak is always greater than the left peak.
Definition 6 A Generalized Median Mechanism (GMM) is a voting mechanism such that,
M(R) = inf
S⊆Π(R)
{ sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),aS}}.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
We first analyze strategy-proof mechanisms in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we inspect Pareto
efficiency on top of strategy-proofness. We later discuss relaxing our assumption of known
locations in Section 4.3. Lastly, we discuss mechanisms that use the whole preference relation
in Section 4.4.
4.1. Strategy-proofness
Our first theorem characterizes strategy-proof voting mechanisms when F is a finite interval.
Under the assumption that a mechanism’s range is a finite interval, we find that strategy-
proofness implies the mechanism being a GMM and vice versa. This is a very similar result
to Moulin (1980), and consists of a wider class of mechanisms than Filos-Ratsikas et al.
(2017). In fact the stretegy-proof mechanisms in Filos-Ratsikas et al. (2017) also belong to
the class of GMM. However, it only includes GMMs which always select either the leftmost
or the rightmost peak. The similarity with the former and the difference with the latter is
due to the fact that in our model the locations of agents are known to the mechanism and the
reported peaks have to be consistent with these locations.
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Assuming F is a finite interval is not very restrictive considering the fact that in any
facility location problem the feasible set would be a finite interval. This assumption also
works for the political decision making models, where the possible stands to take on an issue
is represented as a finite interval.
Theorem 1 Assume the range of M is a finite interval. Also assume that M is a voting
mechanism. Then, M is strategy-proof if and only if M is a GMM.
Proof. We first show the following results which are used to prove the theorem:
Lemma 1 Assume M is a strategy-proof voting mechanism and N = 1. Let x ≤ δi be such
that x ∈ Range(M). Let pi1(Ri),pi2(Ri) be peaks of Ri. Then, M(Ri) ∈ [x,pi1(Ri)]1
Proof. First, note that since x ∈ Range(M), x = M(R′i) for some R′i ∈ R. Fix an Ri with
location δi and peaks pi1(Ri) = pi1 and pi2(Ri) = pi2.
Claim 1 M(Ri)≥ in f{M(R′i),pi1(Ri)}.
Proof of the Claim Suppose not. Let M(Ri) < in f{M(R′i),pi1(Ri)}. If we have M(Ri) <
M(R′i)≤ pi1(Ri), then by the definition of double-peaked preferences, we have M(R′i)PiM(Ri),
contradicting M being strategy-proof. On the other hand, if we have M(Ri) < pi1(Ri) ≤
M(R′i), there exists Ri with the peaks pi1 and pi2 such that M(R′i)PiM(Ri) (see Figure 1), again
contradicting M being strategy-proof.
Claim 2 M(Ri)≤ sup{M(R′i),pi1(Ri)} or M(Ri) = pi2(Ri).
Proof of the Claim Suppose not. Let M(Ri) > sup{M(R′i),pi1(Ri)} and M(Ri) 6= pi2(Ri).
If we have pi1(Ri) ≤ M(R′i) < M(Ri), there exists Ri with the peaks pi1 and pi2 such that
M(R′i)PiM(Ri) (see Figure 2), contradicting M being strategy-proof. On the other hand, if we
have M(R′i)≤ pi1(Ri)< M(Ri), then again there exists Ri with the peaks pi1 and pi2 such that
M(R′i)PiM(Ri) (see Figure 3), which is a contradiction to M being strategy-proof.
Together, Claim 1 and Claim 2 imply Lemma 1.
1With an abuse of notation we use simply [x,pi1(Ri)] throughout the paper whenever it is ambigous whether
it is x≤ pi1(Ri) or pi1(Ri)< x.
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δi
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pi1(Ri)
r
pi2(Ri)
r
M(Ri)
r
M(R′i)
Figure 4.1: A preference relation with M(R′i)PiM(Ri) when M(Ri)< pi1(Ri)≤M(R′i)
r
δi
r
pi1(Ri)
r
pi2(Ri)
r
M(R′i)
r
M(Ri)
Figure 4.2: A preference relation with M(R′i)PiM(Ri) when pi1(Ri)≤M(R′i)< M(Ri)
Lemma 2 Assume M is a strategy-proof voting mechanism and N = 1. Let x ≥ δi be such
that x ∈ Range(M). Let pi1(Ri),pi2(Ri) be peaks of Ri. Then, M(Ri) ∈ [x,pi2(Ri)] or M(Ri) =
pi1(Ri).
Proof. The proof is symmetric to the proof of Lemma 1.
Now we prove that every strategy-proof voting mechanism is a GMM, using induction.
We start with the case where there is only one agent. Suppose N = 1. Fix a vector of d.
Assume M is a strategy-proof voting mechanism and its range is a finite interval.
Let α = in f{M(Ri) | Ri ∈R} and β = sup{M(Ri) | Ri ∈R}.
Claim 3 Either α ≤ β ≤ δi or δi ≤ α ≤ β .
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r
δi
r
pi1(Ri)
r
pi2(Ri)
r
M(Ri)
r
M(R′i)
Figure 4.3: A preference relation with M(R′i)PiM(Ri) when M(R′i)≤ pi1(Ri)< M(Ri)
Proof of the Claim Suppose not. Let α < δi < β . Consider Ri such that pi1(Ri) < α <
δi < β < pi2(Ri). For such Ri, Lemma 1 implies that, since pi2(Ri) /∈ range(M), M(Ri) ∈
[pi1(Ri),α], and therefore M(Ri) = α . Similarly, Lemma 2 implies that M(Ri) = β . Since it
is not possible for both lemmas to hold at the same time, there exists no one-agent strategy-
proof voting mechanism with α < δi < β .
This means we have only two cases:
If α ≤ β ≤ δi , then Lemma 1 implies M(Ri) ∈ [pi1(Ri),α]∩ [pi1(Ri),β ]. This would
mean, whenever α ≤ pi1(Ri) ≤ β , M(Ri) = pi1(Ri). In the case when pi1(Ri) ≤ α ≤ β ,
M(Ri) = α and α ≤ β ≤ pi1(Ri) implies M(Ri) = β . This means that M can be represented
as med{α,β ,pi1(Ri)} or in f{β ,sup{pi1(Ri),α}}. This is a GMM with Π(R) = {pi1(Ri)}.
If δi ≤ α ≤ β , then Lemma 2 implies M(Ri) ∈ [pi2(Ri),α]∩ [pi2(Ri),β ]. Similar to
the argument above, this would mean that M can be represented as med{α,β ,pi2(Ri)} or
in f{β ,sup{pi2(Ri),α}}. This is a GMM with Π(R) = {pi2(Ri)}.2
Next, we assume that our theorem holds for n voters, and show that it holds for n+ 1
voters as well.
Let M(R0,R1, ...,Rn) be a strategy-proof voting mechanism for n+1 voters. Let R0 be
fixed so that M(R0,R1, ...,Rn) is a strategy-proof voting mechanism for n voters, and therefore
2M can also be represented as a GMM with Π(R) = {pi1(Ri),pi2(Ri)}, such that M(Ri) =
in f{β ,sup{pi2(Ri),α1},sup{pi1(Ri),α2},sup{pi1(Ri),pi2(Ri),α3}} with α2 ≥ β and α3 ≥ α1. Note that, it does
not matter for the outcome whether we include both of the peaks of the agent or only one, and in both cases,
pi1(Ri) is irrelevant for the outcome. However, this situation is unique to the one agent model.
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a GMM by our supposition. Let Π(R1, ...,Rn) be the associated set of peaks with M when R0
is fixed. By supposition, we can write M as:
M(R0,R1, ...,Rn) = inf
S⊆Π(R1,...,Rn)
{ sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),aS(R0)}}
Let S0 be a nonempty coalition of peaks such that pi1(R0),pi2(R0) /∈ S0. Choose each
pi j(Ri) such that:
pi j(Ri) =

µ1, pi j(Ri) ∈ S0 and j = 1
µ2, pi j(Ri) ∈ S0 and j = 2
λ1, pi j(Ri) /∈ S0 and j = 1
λ2, pi j(Ri) /∈ S0 and j = 2
Let lim
µ1→−∞
λ2→+∞
µ2,λ1→δi
sup
pi j(Ri)∈S0
{pi j(Ri),aS0(R0)}= a′S0(R0).3
Claim 4 We can replace aS0(R0) with a
′
S0(R0) without changing the behavior of the mecha-
nism.
Proof of the Claim If we have aS0(R0) = a
′
S0(R0), the statement is trivial. So suppose,
aS0(R0) 6= a′S0(R0). Note that, for any pi1(Ri) ∈ S0 we have pi1(Ri) = −∞. Since aS0(R0) ≥
−∞, there exists at least one pi2(Ri) ∈ S0 such that limpi2(Ri) = δi > aS0(R0). Let δ ∗i =
max
pi2(Ri)∈S0
{δi}. Clearly, lim sup
pi j(Ri)∈S0
{pi j(Ri),aS0(R0)} = δ ∗i = a′S0(R0). Let pi∗2 (Ri) be the right
peak of the agent with location δ ∗i . Since pi∗2 (Ri)∈ S0, for all RN ∈R, sup
pi j(Ri)∈S0
{pi j(Ri),aS0(R0)}>
δ ∗i > aS0(R0). Therefore, replacing the real parameter aS0(R0) with δ
∗
i = a
′
S0(R0) does not
change the outcome of the mechanism for any RN ∈RN , as neither of them will ever be the
outcome of this supremum.
Thanks to Claim 4, we replace aS0(R0) with lim sup
pi j(Ri)∈S0
{pi j(Ri),aS0(R0)} without in-
terfering with the mechanism.
Now let lim
µ1→−∞
λ2→+∞
µ2,λ1→δi
M(R0,R1, ...,Rn) = a′S0(R0)
3From now on we will simply write lim to refer this limit operation, omitting µ1→−∞, λ2→+∞, µ2→ δi,
λ1→ δi.
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Claim 5 We can replace aS0(R0) with a
′
S0(R0) without changing the behavior of the mecha-
nism.
Proof of the Claim If we have aS0(R0) = a
′
S0(R0), the statement is trivial. So, suppose
aS0(R0) 6= a′S0(R0). Since we have already replaced aS0(R0)with lim sup
pi j(Ri)∈S0
{pi j(Ri),aS0(R0)},
aS0(R0) = a
′
S0(R0) implies that there exists a T such that lim sup
pi j(Ri)∈T
{pi j(Ri),aT (R0)} <
lim sup
pi j(Ri)∈S0
{pi j(Ri),aS0(R0)} = aS0(R0). Note that, lim sup
pi j(Ri)∈T
{pi j(Ri),aT (R0)} < aS0(R0)
implies that, for any pi2(Ri) ∈ T , we have pi2(Ri) ∈ S0, otherwise the left-hand term would
be equal to +∞. So the set T − S0 consists of only left peaks. Let max
pi1(Ri)∈T−S0
{δi} = δˆi.
Clearly, δˆi is an upper bound for any pi j(Ri) ∈ T − S0, as pi1(Ri) < δi for all i ∈ N by the
definition of double-peaked preferences. Moreover, lim sup
pi j(Ri)∈T
{pi j(Ri),aT (R0)} < aS0(R0)
implies that both δˆi < aS0(R0) (since for any pi1(Ri) ∈ T − S0,pi1(Ri) = δi in the limit) and
aT (R0)< aS0(R0). Since all the other elements in T are also in S0, for any R
N ∈RN we have
sup
pi j(Ri)∈T
{pi j(Ri),aT (R0)} ≤ sup
pi j(Ri)∈S0
{pi j(Ri),aS0(R0)}. This means sup
pi j(Ri)∈S0
{pi j(Ri),aS0(R0)}
is never selected. Moreover, if we replace aS0(R0) with the lim sup
pi j(Ri)∈T
{pi j(Ri),aT} this in-
equality would continue to hold for all RN ∈RN , since for all RN ∈RN we have pi j(Ri) ≤
lim sup
pi j(Ri)∈T
{pi j(Ri),aT (R0)}4 for any pi j(Ri) ∈ T −S0. Therefore, the behaviour of the mech-
anism would not change.
By Claim 5, we update aS0(R0) with limM(R0,R1, ...,Rn), without changing the behav-
ior of mechanism. Note that, in the limit we have R1, ...Rn fixed, and with fixed R1, ...Rn,
M is a one-agent strategy-proof voting mechanism. Therefore, the conditions in the ini-
tial stage should hold for limM(R0,R1, ...,Rn), and therefore they should hold for aS0(R0).
Then, we have two cases: either (i) aS0(R0) = in f{βS0,sup{pi1(R0),αS0}} or (ii) aS0(R0) =
in f{βS0,sup{pi2(R0),αS0}} with αS0 ≤ βS0 . Since S0 was arbitrary, we can make use of this
limit operation for all S ⊆ Π(R1, ...,RN). Therefore, each aS(R0) must take either of these
forms.
4Since for any pi1(Ri) ∈ T ∩ S0, pi j(Ri) = −∞, lim sup
pi j(Ri)∈T
{pi j(Ri),aT} must be equal to either
max
pi2(Ri)∈T∩S0
{δi}= δ ∗i , maxpi1(Ri)∈T−S0
{δi}= δˆi, or aT .
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Without loss of generality, suppose the first case holds. Then, with fixed R0, we can
write M as follows:
M(R0, ...,Rn) = inf
S⊆Π(R1,...,Rn)
{ sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri), in f{βS,sup{pi1(R0),αS}}}
Now, we will show that this mechanism is indeed can be written as a GMM.
For any S⊆Π(R1, ...,Rn), let aS = in f{βS,sup{pi1(R0),αS}}. For any S′= S∪{pi1(R0)},
let aS′ = αS. Let S = {S1, ...Sk} and S′ = {S′1, ...,S′k}. Also let Π(R1, ...,Rn)∪{pi1(R0)} =
Π(R0,R1, ...,Rn). Note that, S and S′ is a partition of 2Π(R0,R1,...,Rn).
Now letM (R0, ...,Rn)= inf
S⊆Π(R0,R1,...,Rn)
{ sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),aS}}. Note thatM is a GMM.
We now prove that, for all RN ∈RN , M andM are equivalent.
Claim 6 If M (R0, ...,Rn) = sup
pi j(Ri)∈S∗
{pi j(Ri),aS∗} for some S∗ ∈ S, then M(R0, ...,Rn) =
M (R0, ...,Rn).
Proof of the Claim By the construction of aS, for any S ∈ S we have sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),aS} =
sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri), in f{βS,sup{pi1(R0),αS}} since aS = in f{βS,sup{pi1(R0),αS}}. Moreover,
sup
pi j(Ri)∈S∗
{pi j(Ri),aS∗} is the infimum of all such S ∈ S (otherwise it would not have been se-
lected fromM ), and S= 2Π(R1,...,Rn) by definition. Hence, M(R0, ...Rn)= sup
pi j(Ri)∈S∗
{pi j(Ri),aS∗}.
Claim 7 For all RN ∈RN ,M (R0, ...,Rn) = sup
pi j(Ri)∈S∗
{pi j(Ri),aS∗} for some S∗ ∈ S.
Proof of the Claim Since S and S′ is a partition of 2Π(R0,R1,...,Rn), proof of this claim is equiv-
alent to showing that sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),aS} ≤ sup
pi j(Ri)∈S′
{pi j(Ri),aS′} where S′ = S∪{pi1(R0)} for
any S⊆Π(R1, ...,Rn). By construction, instead of aS we can write in f{βS,sup{pi1(R0),αS}}
in the left hand term, and αS in the right hand term, so what we need to show is for all
RN ∈ RN , sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri), in f{βS,sup{pi1(R0),αS}}} ≤ sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),pi1(R0),αS} . We
have three cases:
Case 1: pi1(R0)≤ αS.
In this case the left hand side becomes sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),αS}. Since pi1(R0) ≤ αS by
supposition, we can remove pi1(R0) from the right hand term without changing the outcome.
Therefore, the claim holds with equality.
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Case 2: αS < pi1(R0)≤ βS.
In this case the left hand side becomes sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),pi1(R0)}. Since αS < pi1(R0)
by supposition, we can remove αS from the right hand term without changing the outcome.
Hence, the claim again holds with equality.
Case 3: βS < pi1(R0)
In this case the left hand side becomes sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),βS}. Since αS < pi1(R0), we can
further simplify right hand side as sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),pi1(R0)}, and since βS < pi1(R0), we have
sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),βS} ≤ sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),pi1(R0)}.
Together, Claim 6 and Claim 7 establish that for all RN ∈RN , M(R0, ...,Rn)=M (R0, ...,Rn).
An identical proof can be constructed for a GMM with Π(R0,R1, ...,Rn) = Π(R1, ...,Rn)∪
{pi2(R0)}. A GMM with Π(R0,R1, ...,Rn) = Π(R1, ...,Rn)∪ {pi1(R0),pi2(R0)} can be con-
structed by adding a f aux agent with its preference identical to R0, and repeating each step
to include the other peak in the last step.
In the second part of the proof, we show that any GMM is strategy-proof. Assume M
is a GMM with n agents.
Fix some agent k ∈ N with location δk. Let Rk be the preference relation of k and
let pi j(Rk) be the peaks of Rk. Suppose M(R1, ...,Rn) = x with x 6= pi1(Rk) and x 6= pi2(Rk).
Since M(R1, ...,Rn) = x, there exists an S⊆Π(R1, ...,Rn) such that x= sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),aS} ≤
sup
pi j(Ri)∈S′
{pi j(Ri),aS′} for any S′ ⊆Π(R1, ...,Rn). We have four cases:
Case 1: x < pi1(Rk)
Then clearly pi1(Rk),pi2(Rk) /∈ S. Since x is already inside the infimum operation, for
any R′k ∈R, M(R′k,R−k) ≤M(Rk,R−k). M(R′k,R−k) ≤M(Rk,Rk) < pi1(Rk) implies for any
R′k ∈R we have M(Rk,R−k)RkM(R′k,R−k).
Case 2: pi2(Rk)< x
pi1(Rk)< pi2(Rk)< x implies that for any S′⊆Π(R1, ...,Rn), there exists either a pi j(Ri)∈
S′ with pi2(Rk)< x ≤ pi j(Ri) or pi2(Rk)< x ≤ aS′ , otherwise x would not have been selected.
Therefore, for all S′⊆Π(R1, ...,Rn), for any R′N ∈RN with R′−k =R−k, x≤ sup
pi j(Ri)∈S′
{pi j(Ri),aS′}≤
sup
pi j(R′i)∈S′
{pi j(R′i),aS′}. Since each supremum inside the infimum operation is weakly greater
than x for any R′k ∈R, the infimum of them will be weakly greater as well, implying M(Rk,R−k)≤
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M(R′k,R−k). Therefore, by the definition of double-peaked preferences and by pi2(Rk) <
M(Rk,R−k)≤M(R′k,R−k), for any R′k ∈R we have M(Rk,R−k)RkM(R′k,R−k).
Case 3: pi1(Rk)< x≤ δk
Then clearly pi2(Rk) /∈ S. If pi1(Rk) /∈ S, we have for all R′N ∈ RN with R′−k = R−k,
sup
pi j(R′i)∈S
{pi j(R′i),aS} = x. If pi1(Rk) ∈ S, since for all R′k ∈R, pi1(R′k) < δk, for all R′N ∈RN
with R′−k = R−k, we have sup
pi j(R′i)∈S
{pi j(R′i),aS} ∈ [x,δk). Therefore, there exists no R′k ∈ R
such that δk ≤M(R′k,R−k) as sup
pi j(R′i)∈S
{pi j(R′i),aS} is inside the infimum operation. Moreover,
since x is selected in the first place, we know that for all S′ 6= S, x = sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),aS} ≤
sup
pi j(Ri)∈S′
{pi j(Ri),aS′}, therefore there exists no R′k ∈R such that M(R′k,R−k)< x. Since for all
R′k ∈R we have pi1(Rk)<M(Rk,R−k)≤M(R′k,R−k)< δk, by the definition of double-peaked
preferences we have M(Rk,R−k)RkM(R′k,R−k).
Case 4: δk < x < pi2(Rk)
Then again clearly pi2(Rk) /∈ S. Moreover, δk < x implies there exists pi j(Ri) ∈ S with
pi j(Ri)= x> δk or aS = x> δk. Since pi1(R′k)< δk for all R
′
k ∈R, we have sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),aS}=
x for all R′k ∈ R and R′−k = R−k. Therefore, x is always inside the infimum operation,
which implies there exists no R′k ∈ R such that x < M(R′k,R−k). Moreover, for all Sˆ with
pi2(Rk) /∈ Sˆ, there exists either a pi j(Ri) ∈ Sˆ with pi j(Ri) ≥ x or aSˆ ≥ x, otherwise x would
not have been selected. For all S′ with pi2(Rk) ∈ S′, since for all R′k ∈ R, δk < pi2(R′k), we
have δk < sup
pi j(Ri)∈S′
{pi j(Ri),aS′}. Since all the values inside the infimum operation are greater
than δk, for all R′k ∈ R we have δk < M(R′k,R−k) ≤ M(Rk,R−k) < pi2(Rk). This implies
M(Rk,R−k)RkM(R′k,R−k) by the definition of double-peaked preferences.
Since for all R′k ∈ R, we always have M(Rk,R−k)RkM(R′k,R−k), GMM is strategy-
proof, concluding the proof of Theorem 1.
In Theorem 2, we show that our characterization works when the assumption that F
is a finite interval is replaced with continuity. Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 also show that
having a finite interval as range and strategy-proofness together imply continuity for a voting
mechanism, since GMM is continuous. However, continuity and strategy-proofness does
not necessarily imply that the range of the mechanism is a finite interval, hence these two
properties are not completely equivalent for strategy-proof voting mechanisms in our model.
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Theorem 2 Assume that M is a voting mechanism. Then, M is continuous and strategy-proof
if and only if M is a GMM.
Proof. The proof of this theorem follows from the proof of Theorem 1, except Claim 3 where
we use the assumption that M’s range is a finite interval. Therefore, to prove Theorem 2, it is
sufficient to show that (i) Claim 3 still holds when the assumption of M’s range being a finite
interval is replaced with continuity, and (ii) GMM is continuous.
First we restate and prove Claim 3:
Assume M is a continuous and strategy-proof voting mechanism. Let N = 1. Let
α = in f{M(Ri) | Ri ∈R} and β = sup{M(Ri) | Ri ∈R}.
Claim 8 Either α ≤ β ≤ δi or δi ≤ α ≤ β .
Proof of the Claim Suppose not. Let α < δi < β . Consider the case α ≤ pi1(Ri) < δi <
pi2(Ri)≤ β . By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 we have either M(pi1,pi2) = pi15 or M(pi1,pi2) = pi2.
Suppose M(pi1,pi2) = pi1 is true. Fix pi2 = pi∗2 .
Claim 8.1 M(pi1,pi∗2 ) = pi1 for all pi1 ∈ [α,δi).
Proof Suppose not. Fix a pi1 = pi∗1 such that Md(pi
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2 ) = pi
∗
1 . Let pˆi1 = in f{pi1 ∈
(pi∗1 ,d) : M(pi1,pi
∗
2 )= pi
∗
2}. (If it doesn’t exist choose pˆi1 = sup{pi1 ∈ (α,pi∗1 ) : M(pi1,pi∗2 )= pi∗2}
and modify the steps below accordingly.)
Take a sequence (pi1)n→ pˆi1 such that pin1 < pˆi1 for all n with pi01 > pi∗1 . Note that since
pˆi1 = in f{pi1 ∈ (pi∗1 ,d) : M(pi1,pi∗2 ) = pi∗2}, M(pin1 ,pi∗2 ) = pin1 for all n. Then by continuity
Md(pˆi1,pi∗2 ) = pˆi1. Now take a sequence (pi1)k → pˆi1 such that for all k, pik1 ∈ {pi1 ∈ (pi∗1 ,d) :
M(pi1,pi∗2 ) = pi
∗
2}. Then by continuity M(pˆi1,pi∗2 ) = pi∗2 . Contradiction.
Now fix a pi1 = pi∗1 . Note that, by the above claim M(pi
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2 ) = pi
∗
1 .
Claim 8.2 M(pi∗1 ,pi2) = pi
∗
1 for all pi2 ∈ (δi,+∞)
Proof Suppose not. Let pˆi2 = in f{pi2 ∈ (pi∗2 ,+∞) : M(pi∗1 ,pi2) = pi2}. (If it doesn’t exist,
choose pˆi2 = sup{pi2 ∈ (δi,pi∗2 ) : M(pi∗1 ,pi2)= pi2} and modify the following steps accordingly.)
Take a sequence (pi2)n→ pˆi2 such that pin2 < pˆi2 for all n with pi02 > pi∗2 . Note that since
pˆi2 = in f{pi2 ∈ (pi∗2 ,+∞) : M(pi∗1 ,pi2) = pi2}, M(pi∗1 ,pin2 ) = pi∗1 for all n. Then by continuity,
5To make the proof easier to follow we wil use M(pi1,pi2) instead of M(Ri) as we will only be changing the
peaks and M is a voting mechanism.
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M(pi∗1 , pˆi2) = pi
∗
1 . Now take a sequence (pi2)k→ pˆi2 such that for all k, pik2 ∈ {pi2 ∈ (pi∗2 ,+∞) :
M(pi∗1 ,pi2) = pi2}. Then by continuity, Md(pi∗1 , pˆi2) = pˆi2. Contradiction.
If α =−∞, Claim 8.1 and 8.2 together implies M(pi1,pi2) = pi1 for all pi1,pi2. Therefore,
there exists no Ri with location δi such that M(pi1(Ri),pi2(Ri)) = pi2(Ri) and therefore the
range(M) = (−∞,δi) which is a contradiction to our supposition α < δi < β . In the next
claim, we suppose α is finite and show that this result still holds.
Claim 8.3 M(pi1,pi2) = α for all pi1 ∈ (−∞,α).
Proof Suppose not. Since we assume α < δi < β and α is finite, β =+∞ by Claim 3
of Theorem 1. Fix an arbitrary pi2 = pi∗2 . Note that, for all pi1 ∈ (−∞,α): M(pi1,pi∗2 ) = pi∗2 by
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 since pi1 /∈ range(M).
Take a sequence (pi1)n→ α such that pin1 < α for all n. Note that since pin1 ∈ (−∞,α)
for all n, M(pin1 ,pi
∗
2 ) = pi
∗
2 for all n. Then by continuity M(α,pi
∗
2 ) = pi
∗
2 . However, by Claim
8.1, M(α,pi∗2 ) = α . Contradiction.
Since for all pi1,pi2, M(pi1,pi2) = pi1, we have range(M) = (−∞,δi), concluding the
proof of Claim 8.
Now we prove that GMM is continuous:
Let M be a GMM for n agents. Let RN , R′N ∈RN be two preference profiles such that
for any j ∈ {1,2} and for all i∈N, |pi j(Ri)−pi j(R′i)| ≤ ε for some ε > 0. Clearly, for any S⊆
Π(R), | sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),aS}− sup
pi j(R′i)∈S
{pi j(R′i),aS}|≤ ε . Hence, | infS⊆Π(R){ suppi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),aS}}−
inf
S⊆Π(R′)
{ sup
pi j(R′i)∈S
{pi j(R′i),aS}}| ≤ ε implying |M(R0, ...,Rn)−M(R′0, ...,R′n)| ≤ ε .
There are indeed strategy-proof voting mechanisms that are not continuous and not
GMM. An example of such mechanism is given below:
Example 1 Let N = 1. Let M be a voting mechanism given a > 0 such that:
M(Ri) =
pi2(Ri), pi2(Ri)≤ api1(Ri), o/w
Observe that range(M) = (−∞,δi)∪(δi,a]. Moreover, since this mechanism will assign
either pi1(Ri) or pi2(Ri) to any preference, it is strategy-proof. However, there is a jump at
pi2(Ri) = a, therefore it is not continuous.
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4.2. Pareto Efficiency
It turns out that the class of GMM does not contain any Pareto efficient mechanism. We show
that in Theorem 3. This implies an impossibility result such that if the range of the mechanism
is a finite interval or the mechanism is continuous, then it cannot be both strategy-proof and
Pareto efficient.
Theorem 3 There exists no continuous voting mechanism that is strategy-proof and Pareto
efficient at the same time.
Proof. By Theorem 2, any strategy-proof and continuous voting mechanism is a GMM.
Hence, to prove Theorem 3, it is sufficient to show that GMM is not Pareto efficient. Let
N = {1, ...,n} be the set of agents with locations δi = d∗ for all i∈N. For all i∈N, let Ri ∈R
be the associated preference relations such that there exists i,k ∈N with pi1(Ri) 6= pi1(Rk), and
pi2(Ri) 6= pi2(Rk). Let M be a GMM and let M(R1, ...,Rn) = x. Note that if x = d∗, M cannot
be Pareto efficient, since there exists ε > 0 such that (x+ε)Pix for all i ∈ N. Hence, there are
two cases to look at: either x < d∗ or d∗ < x.
Case 1: x < d∗.
M(R1, ...,Rn)= x implies there exists S⊆Π(R1, ...,Rn) such that x= sup
pi j(Ri)∈S
{pi j(Ri),aS}.
Since x< d∗< pi2(Ri), there exists no i∈N such that pi2(Ri)∈ S. This implies that right peaks
are irrelevant to the mechanism. Let R′N ∈RN be such that, for all i ∈ N, pi1(R′i) = pi1(Ri)
and pi2(R′i) = pi2(R1). Note that, since we only changed the right peaks, M(R′1, ...,R
′
n) = x.
Since there exists i,k ∈ N with pi1(R′i) 6= pi1(R′k), x cannot be the left peak for every
agent. Therefore, there exists i ∈ N such that pi2(R1)P′i x. Moreover, since pi2(R1) is the right
peak for every agent, there exists no j ∈ N such that xP′jpi2(R1). Hence, M is not Pareto
efficient.
The proof for Case 2 is symmetric.
Theorem 4 There exists no voting mechanism with a finite interval as its range and which is
strategy-proof and Pareto efficient at the same time.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is the same with the proof of Theorem 3.
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4.3. Unobservable Locations
When δ is not fixed, and is also a function of Ri, not every GMM is strategy-proof, as it
is possible for agents to manipulate the mechanism by misreporting their locations (Filos-
Ratsikas et al., 2017). We demonstrate this fact with an example:
Example 2 Let N = 2 and X = [0,100]. Let M be a GMM with the parameters,
aS =

100, |S|= 0
80, |S|= 1
20, |S| ≥ 2
Let Ri be the preference relation of agent i with pi1(Ri) = 10 and pi2(Ri) = 40. Let
R j be the preference relation of agent j with pi1(R j) = 30 and pi2(R j) = 70. It is easily
verifiable that M(Ri,R j) = 30. Now consider R′i with pi1(R′i) = 40 and pi2(R′i) = 60. Notice
that, M(R′i,R j) = 40. Since pi2(Ri) = 40, M(R′i,R j)PiM(Ri,R j), violating strategy-proofness.
Filos-Ratsikas et al. (2017) shows that even when the distance of peaks to the agent’s
location is assumed same and symmetric for everyone (in other words, when the voting mech-
anism only needs the location information), the strategy-proof mechanisms are only those
who select either leftmost or rightmost peak. Removing the assumption of fixed locations
does not change the impossibility result in theorems 3 and 4 either, since the strategy-proof
mechanisms in this case are again GMMs.
4.4. Mechanisms that Use the Whole Preference Relation
When we relax the assumption of a voting mechanism, the class of strategy-proof mecha-
nisms are larger than GMM. To illustrate this, we present an example of such a mechanism.
Example 3 Let N = 1. Let M be a mechanism such that:
24
M(Ri) =
pi1(Ri), [δi+pi1(Ri)]/2i [δi+pi2(Ri)]/2pi2(Ri), o/w
M is strategy-proof since it always chooses a peak of the agent. However, it uses infor-
mation other than the peaks and the location, hence, it is not a voting mechanism.
This example also demonstrates that, in our model strategy-proofness does not imply
that the mechanism uses only the peak information, contrary to the case with single-peaked
preferences as demonstrated in Barbera` and Jackson (1994).
25
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
We define a class of mechanisms called Generalized Median Mechanisms (GMM), in a very
similar manner to Moulin (1980). We show that any strategy-proof mechanism can be rep-
resented as a GMM when agents have double-peaked preferences with their locations ob-
servable. We demonstrate that our assumption of observable locations is fundamental to our
characterization, and when agents are free to report their locations not every GMM is strategy-
proof. For our characterization to work, we also need to assume either the mechanism’s range
is a finite interval or it is continuous.
Additionally, we show that GMM is not Pareto efficient, which implies an impossibility
result for a mechanism to be both Pareto efficient and strategy-proof in our model. Lastly,
we show that strategy-proofness does not imply the mechanism uses only the peaks as input,
and provide an example of a strategy-proof mechanism that uses more information.
Our characterization includes non-anonymous mechanisms as well, and we consider
adding anonymity as a possible direction for further study. Another possibility for future
research would be assuming symmetricity around the peaks, and checking whether there is a
wider class of strategy-proof mechanisms in that setting.
26
References
Arrow, K. J. (1963). Social choice and individual values (No. 12). Yale University Press.
Barbera`, S., Berga, D., and Moreno, B. (2010). Individual versus group strategy-proofness:
When do they coincide? Journal of Economic Theory, 145(5), 1648–1674.
Barbera`, S., Gul, F., and Stacchetti, E. (1993). Generalized median voter schemes and
committees. Journal of Economic Theory, 61(2), 262–289.
Barbera`, S., and Jackson, M. (1994). A characterization of strategy-proof social choice
functions for economies with pure public goods. Social Choice and Welfare, 11(3),
241–252.
Barbera`, S., and Moreno, B. (2011). Top monotonicity: A common root for single peaked-
ness, single crossing and the median voter result. Games and Economic Behavior,
73(2), 345–359.
Barbera`, S., and Peleg, B. (1990). Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous prefer-
ences. Social Choice and Welfare, 7(1), 31–38.
Egan, P. J. (2014). ”Do something” politics and double-peaked policy preferences. The
Journal of Politics, 76(2), 333–349.
Filos-Ratsikas, A., Li, M., Zhang, J., and Zhang, Q. (2017). Facility location with double-
peaked preferences. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 1–27.
Flowers, M. R. (1975). The possibility of double-peaked preference rankings for public
school expenditures. Public Choice, 23(1), 81–85.
Gibbard, A. (1973). Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica:
journal of the Econometric Society, 587–601.
Manjunath, V. (2014). Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-
dipped. International Journal of Game Theory, 43(3), 579–597.
Masso´, J., and Moreno de Barreda, I. (2011). On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-
peakedness. Games and Economic Behavior, 72(2), 467–484.
Moulin, H. (1980). On strategy-proofness and single peakedness. Public Choice, 35(4),
437–455.
27
Satterthwaite, M. A. (1975). Strategy-proofness and arrow’s conditions: Existence and
correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal
of economic theory, 10(2), 187–217.
28
